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Abstract
We consider auctions in which the players have very limited knowledge about
their own valuations. Specifically, the only information that a Knightian player
i has about the profile of true valuations, θ∗, consists of a set of distributions,
from one of which θ∗i has been drawn.
The VCG mechanism guarantees very high social welfare both in single- and
multi-good auctions, so long as Knightian players do not select strategies that
are dominated. With such Knightian players, however, we prove that the VCG
mechanism guarantees very poor social welfare in unrestricted combinatorial
auctions.
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1 Introduction
In [CMZ14] we motivate the problem of mechanism design for Knightian players,
and prove that (1) dominant-strategy mechanisms for single-good and multi-unit
auctions cannot provide good social-welfare efficiency, but (2) the second-price and
Vickrey mechanisms deliver good social-welfare performance, for these two settings,
in undominated strategies.
In this report, we prove that the VCG mechanism guarantees very poor social
welfare in unrestricted combinatorial auctions, if each Knightian player chooses an
undominated strategy.
2 Model
We study unrestricted combinatorial auctions, where there are n players and m dis-
tinct goods. The set of possible allocations A consists of all possible partitions A of
[m] into 1 + n subsets, A = (A0, A1, . . . , An), where A0 is the (possibly empty) set of
unassigned goods and Ai is the (possibly empty) set of goods assigned to player i.
For each player i, a valuation is a function mapping each possible subset of the
goods to a non-negative real, and the set of all possible valuations is Θi = {θi : 2[m] →
R≥0 | θi(∅) = 0}. The profile of the players’ true valuations is θ∗ = (θ∗1, . . . , θ∗n) ∈ Θ.
The set of possible outcomes is Ω
def
= A×Rn≥0. If (A,P ) ∈ Ω, we refer Pi as the price
charged to player i. We assume quasi-linear utilities. That is, the utility function Ui
of a player i maps a valuation θi and an outcome ω = (A,P ) to Ui(θi, ω)
def
= θi(Ai)−Pi.
If ω is a distribution over outcomes, we also denote by Ui(θi, ω) the expected
utility of player i.
2.1 Knightian Valuation Uncertainty
In our model, a player i’s sole information about θ∗ consists of Ki, a set of distributions
over Θi, from one of which θ
∗
i has been drawn. (The true valuations are uncorrelated.)
That is, Ki is i’s sole (and private) information about his own true valuation θ∗i .
Furthermore, for every opponent j, i has no information (or beliefs) about θ∗j or Kj.
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Given that all he cares about is his expected (quasi-linear) utility, a player i may
‘collapse’ each distribution Di ∈ Ki to its expectation Eθi∼Di [θi].1 Therefore, for
unrestricted combinatorial auctions, a mathematically equivalent formulation of the
Knightian valuation model is the following:
Definition 2.1 (Knightian valuation model). For each player i, i’s sole information
about θ∗ is a set Ki, the candidate (valuation) set of i, such that θ∗i ∈ Ki ⊂ Θi.
We refer to an element of Ki as a candidate valuation.
In Knightian valuation model, a mechanism’s performance will of course depend on
the inaccuracy of the players’ candidate sets, which we measure as follows.
Definition 2.2. The candidate set Ki of a player i is (at most) δ-approximate if, for
each subset S ⊆ [m], letting Ki(S) def= {θi(S) | θi ∈ Ki}, supKi(S)− inf Ki(S) ≤ δ.
An auction is (at most) δ-approximate if each Ki is δ-approximate.
2.2 Social Welfare, Mechanisms, and Knightian Dominance
Social welfare. The social welfare of an allocation A = (A0, A1, . . . , An), SW(A),
is defined to be
∑
i θ
∗
i (Ai); and the maximum social welfare, MSW, is defined to
be maxA∈A SW(A). (That is, SW and MSW continue to be defined relative to the
players’ true valuations θ∗i , whether or not the players know them exactly.)
More generally, the social welfare of an allocation A relative to a valuation profile
θ, SW(θ, A), is
∑
i θi(Ai); and the maximum social welfare relative to θ, MSW(θ), is
maxA∈A SW(θ, A). Thus, SW(A) = SW(θ∗, A) and MSW = MSW(θ∗).
Mechanisms and strategies. A mechanism M specifies, for each player i, a set
Si. We interchangeably refer to each member of Si as a pure strategy/action/report
of i, and similarly, a member of ∆(Si) a mixed strategy/action/report of i.
After each player i, simultaneously with his opponents, reports a strategy si in
Si, M maps the reported strategy profile s to an outcome M(s) ∈ Ω.
IfM is probabilistic, thenM(s) ∈ ∆(Ω). Thus, as per our notation, Ui(θi,M(s)) def=
1Whatever the auction mechanism used, this equivalence holds for any auction where each Θi is
a convex set. In particular, this includes unrestricted combinatorial auctions of m distinct goods.
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Eω∼M(s)[Ui(θi, ω)] for each player i.
Note that Si = Θi for the direct mechanisms in the classical setting.
The VCG mechanism. In our auctions, the VCG mechanism, denoted VCG, maps
a profile of valuations θ ∈ Θ1 × · · · ×Θn, to an outcome (A,P ), where
A ∈ arg maxA∈A SW(θ, A) and, for each player i, Pi = MSW(θ−i) −
∑
j 6=i θ(Ai).
Ties can be broken in any way and, if probabilistically (e.g., at random), then we
extend the computation of the expected utility to also include this random choice.
Knightian undominated strategies. Given a mechanism M , a pure strategy si of
a player i with a candidate set Ki is (weakly) undominated, in symbols si ∈ UDi(Ki),
if i does not have another (possibly mixed) strategy σi such that
(1) ∀θi ∈ Ki ∀s−i ∈ S−i EUi
(
θi,M(σi, s−i)
) ≥ Ui(θi,M(si, s−i)), and
(2) ∃θi ∈ Ki ∃s−i ∈ S−i EUi
(
θi,M(σi, s−i)
)
> Ui
(
θi,M(si, s−i)
)
.
If K is a product or a profile of candidate sets, that is, if K = (K1, . . . , Kn) or
K = K1 × · · · ×Kn, then UD(K) def= UD1(K1)× · · · × UDn(Kn).
Note that the above notion of an undominated strategy is a natural extension of
its classical counterpart, but other extensions are possible.
3 Result
To prove the inadequacy of the VCG in undominated strategies for unrestricted com-
binatorial auctions, it suffices to consider the case where there are exactly n = 2
players.2 We show that in δ-approximate combinatorial auctions with 2 players and
m goods, the VCG mechanism cannot, in undominated strategies, guarantee social
welfare greater than MSW − (2m − 3)δ:
2If there are more than 2 players, one can always assume that the players other than 1 and 2
value 0 (and report 0 for) every subset of the goods.
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Theorem 1. In a combinatorial Knightian VCG auction with 2 players and m
goods, there exist products of δ-approximate candidate sets K = K1×K2 and profiles
(v1, v2) ∈ UD(K), such that
∀θ ∈ K1 ×K2 SW
(
θ,VCG(v1, v2)
) ≤ MSW(θ)− (2m − 3)δ .
Proof. Let pi1, . . . , pi2m−1 be any permutation of all non-empty subsets of [m] such
that, whenever j < k, pij 6⊇ pik.3 We set pi2m def= pi1, and denote by S the complement
of a subset S: that is, S
def
= [m] \ S.
We begin by choosing a highly-deviating strategy for player 1, and argue that it
is undominated. Specifically, choose arbitrarily a real number x larger than δ, and
then choose a candidate set K1 and a strategy (i.e., a valuation) v1 as follows:
K1
def
=
{
θ1 ∈ Θ1
∣∣∣ ∀ non-empty S ⊆ [m], θ1(S) ∈ [x− δ/2, x+ δ/2]} and
v1(pii)
def
= x+ (i− 1)δ ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , 2m − 1} .
Note that v1 6∈ K1. (Indeed, v1(pii) ∈ K1(pi1) only for i = 1.)
We now prove that the strategy v1 is undominated. More precisely,
Claim 3.1. v1 ∈ UD1(K1).
Proof. We proceed by contradiction. Assume that v1 is (weakly) dominated by a
strategy v′1 6= v1 relative to the candidate set K1. There are two cases to consider: v′1
is pure and v′i is mixed.
Proof when v′1 is pure
We contradict the assumption that v′1 dominates v1 relative to K1 by exhibiting
a valuation θ1 ∈ K1 and a ‘witness’ strategy v2 for player 2 such that
U1(θ1,VCG(v1, v2)) > U1(θ1,VCG(v
′
1, v2)) . (3.1)
The first step is to distinguish between the following three cases (at least one of
3In particular, we can order the subsets of [m] by increasing cardinality, and lexicographically
within a given cardinality: that is, when m = 3, {1}, {2}, {3}, {1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}, {1, 2, 3}.
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them always holds4):
(1) ∃ i ∈ {1, . . . , 2m − 1}, v1(pii+1)− v1(pii) > max
T⊆pii+1
v′1(T )−max
T⊆pii
v′1(T )
(2) v1(pi1) > max
T⊆pi1
v′1(T )
(3) v1(pi1) < max
T⊆pi1
v′1(T )
Case (1). Suppose that case (1) holds. Then there exists some i ∈ {1, . . . , 2m − 1}
such that
∃∆ v1(pii+1)− v1(pii) > ∆ > max
T⊆pii+1
v′1(T )−max
T⊆pii
v′1(T ) . (3.2)
From here we distinguish two additional sub-cases:
Sub-Case (1.1). Inequality (3.2) holds for i 6∈ {2m − 2, 2m − 1}.
In this case neither pii nor pii+1 is pi2m−1 = [m]. In addition, we can assume that ∆ > 0
since v1(pii+1)− v1(pii) = δ > 0.
To show (3.1) we define v2 and θ1 ∈ K1 as follows. Letting H be a huge number
(e.g., much higher than v1(S) and v
′
1(S) for any subset S of the goods), we define
v2 : v2(pii+1) = H −∆, v2(pii) = H, and v2(S) = 0 for all other non-empty subsets S ⊆ [m];
θ1 : θ1(pii+1) = x+ δ/2 and θ1(S) = x− δ/2 for all other non-empty subsets S ⊆ [m].
For our choices of θ1, v1, v
′
1 and v2 we now argue that:
U1(θ1,VCG(v1, v2)) = (x+ δ/2)−∆ (3.3)
U1(θ1,VCG(v
′
1, v2)) = (x− δ/2)− 0 . (3.4)
Proof of (3.3) To prove (3.3) it suffices to show that, in the outcome VCG(v1, v2), the
allocation is (pii+1, pii+1) and player 1’s price is ∆. Indeed, because H was chosen
to be sufficiently large, the only allocations we should consider are (T, pii+1)
and (T ′, pii) where T ⊆ pii+1 and T ′ ⊆ pii. By construction pii+1 maximizes
v1(T ) among all T ⊆ pii+1, and pii maximizes v1(T ) among all T ⊆ pii; in
particular, the only two possible allocations are (pii, pii) and (pii+1, pii+1). Because
4Indeed, if (1) is not satisfied, then summing up all its inequalities we get v1(pii) =
maxT⊆pii v
′
1(T ) + c for some common constant c. However, if neither (2) nor (3) is satisfied, then c
must be 0, and we get v1(pii) = maxT⊆pii v
′
1(T ) for all i. Since T enumerates over all possible subsets
of [m], this further implies that v1(T ) = v
′
1(T ) for all T , which contradicts v1 6= v′1.
5
v1(pii+1)−v1(pii) > ∆ = v2(pii)−v2(pii+1) according to (3.2), the allocation chosen
must be (pii+1, pii+1). As for the price: player 2 is allocated pii+1 but, if player 1
did not exist, player 2 would be allocated pii, and gain ∆ in utility; thus player
1’s price is indeed ∆.
Proof of (3.4) To prove (3.4) it suffices to show that, in the outcome VCG(v′1, v2),
the allocation is (T, pii), for some T ⊆ pii and T 6= pii+1, and player 1’s price is
0. As before, because H was chosen to be sufficiently large, the only allocations
we should consider are (T, pii+1) and (T
′, pii) where T ⊆ pii+1 and T ′ ⊆ pii. Using
(3.2) again, we get
v2(pii)− v2(pii+1) = ∆ > max
T⊆pii+1
v′1(T )−max
T⊆pii
v′1(T )
which further implies that the allocation must be (T, pii). As for the price: player
2 is allocated pii and, if player 1 did not exist, player 2 would still be allocated pii;
thus player 1’s price is indeed 0. In addition, we must have T 6= pii+1: otherwise
the allocation would be (pii+1, pii), implying that pii+1 ( pii, contradicting our
choice of pi.
By (3.2) and the construction of v1, it is clear that δ = v1(pii+1) − v1(pii) > ∆.
Accordingly, utility (3.3) is greater than utility (3.4). That is, inequality (3.1) holds
in Sub-Case (1.1).
Sub-Case (1.2). Inequality (3.2) holds for i ∈ {2m − 2, 2m − 1}.
The proof that inequality (3.1) holds in sub-case 1.2 is similar to that of sub-case
1.1. The only difference is that, since this is a boundary case, one must pay attention
to the fact that either pii or pii+1 may be the empty set. That is, we cannot set
v2(pii+1) = H −∆ or v2(pii) = H, for an arbitrarily large H, because v2(∅) must be
zero. Instead, one must choose the value of H to precisely coincide with v2(∅) = 0.
Case (2). Suppose that case (2) holds. Then,
∃∆ > 0 v1(pi1) > ∆ > maxT⊆pi1v′1(T ) . (3.5)
To show (3.1) we define v2 and θ1 ∈ K1 as follows. Letting H be a huge number
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(e.g., much higher than v1(S) and v
′
1(S) for any subset S of the goods), we define
v2 : v2(pi1) = H, v2([m]) = H + ∆, and v2(S) = 0 for all other non-empty subsets S ⊆ [m];
θ1 : θ1(S) = x+ δ/2 for all non-empty S ⊆ [m].
For our choices of θ1, v1, v
′
1, and v2 we now argue that:
U1(θ1,VCG(v1, v2)) = (x+ δ/2)−∆ (3.6)
U1(θ1,VCG(v
′
1, v2)) = 0 . (3.7)
Proof of (3.6) To prove (3.6) it suffices to show that, in the outcome VCG(v1, v2),
the allocation is (pi1, pi1) and player 1’s price is ∆. Indeed, because H was
chosen to be sufficiently large, the only allocations we should consider are (T, pi1)
and (∅, [m]) where T ⊆ pii. By construction pi1 maximizes v1(T ) among all
T ⊆ pii, so the only two possible allocations are (pi1, pi1) and (∅, [m]). Because
v1(pi1)+v2(pi1) = v1(pi1)+H > H+∆ = v2([m]) according to (3.5), the allocation
chosen must be (pii, pii). As for the price: player 2 is allocated pi1 but, if player 1
did not exist, player 2 would be allocated [m], and gain ∆ in utility; thus player
1’s price is indeed ∆.
Proof of (3.7) To prove (3.7) it suffices to show that, in the outcome VCG(v′1, v2), the
allocation is (∅, [m]). As before, because H was chosen to be sufficiently large,
the only allocations we should consider are (T, pi1) and (∅, [m]) where T ⊆ pii.
This time by relying on the fact that v2([m]) = H + ∆ > H + maxT⊆pi1 v
′
1(T )
from (3.5), we deduce that the allocation is in fact (∅, [m]).
By (3.5), x = v1(pi1) > ∆. Therefore, utility (3.6) is greater than utility (3.7), yielding
(3.1). That is, inequality (3.1) holds in Case (2).
Case (3). Suppose that case (3) holds. Then,
∃∆ > 0 v1(pi1) < ∆ < maxT⊆pi1v′1(T ) .
The proof that inequality (3.1) holds in Case (3) is totally symmetrical to that of
Case (2).
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In all cases above we have shown that (3.1) holds, thus finishing the proof of Claim 3.1
when v′1 is a pure strategy.
Proof when v′1 is mixed.
Assuming that v1 is dominated by a mixed strategy v
′
1, we reach a contradiction by
proving that inequality (3.1) holds in expectation. The ideas of the proof are the
same, although the analysis must now be applied to all the pure strategies in the
support of v′1, rather than to v
′
1 itself, which makes the argument notationally more
involved.
This completes the proof of Claim 3.1. 
Having constructed v1 ∈ UD1(K1), we continue the proof of Theorem 1 letting:
v2(S)
def
=
(2
m − i− 1.5)δ if S = pii for some i ∈ {1, . . . , 2m − 2}
x+ (2m − 2.5)δ if S = [m]
,
K2
def
=
{
θ2 ∈ Θ2
∣∣∣ ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , 2m − 1}, θ2(pii) ∈ [v2(pii), v2(pii) + δ]} .
Note that, by construction, v2 ∈ K2, which easily implies the following
Claim 3.2. v2 ∈ UD2(K2).
Proof. Suppose, by the way of contradiction, that there exists a strategy v′2, different
from v2, that (weakly) dominates v2 relative to K2. Then, by (the first property of)
the definition of Knightian dominance, we have
∀θ2 ∈ K2 ∀v1 ∈ Θ1 EU2(θ2,VCG(v1, v2)) ≤ EU2(θ2,VCG(v1, v′2)) .
Since v2 ∈ K2, we can choose θ2 = v2 in the above inequality, getting
∀v1 ∈ Θ1 EU2(v2,VCG(v1, v2)) ≤ EU2(v2,VCG(v1, v′2)) .
However, the fact that the VCG mechanism is dominant-strategy-truthful in the
exact-valuation world tells us that
∀v1 ∈ Θ1 EU2(v2,VCG(v1, v2)) ≥ EU2(v2,VCG(v1, v′2)) .
This implies that the two different strategies v2 and v
′
2 are equivalent in player 2’s
perspective! However, since v2 is strictly monotone —i.e., v2(S) < v2(T ) for any
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S ( T— no different but equivalent strategy exists for v2. Indeed, for any v′2 6= v2,
one can always find a strategy v1 ∈ Θ1, so that player 2’s utilities in the outcomes
VCG(v1, v2) and VCG(v1, v
′
2) are different. We thus have reached a contradiction and
proved Claim 3.2. 
Having specified K1, v1, K2, and v2, all we have left is analyzing the social welfare
performance.
Let us first compute the allocation of the outcome VCG(v1, v2). The only al-
locations to consider are (pi2m−1,∅), (∅, pi2m−1), and (pii, pii), for some index i ∈
{1, . . . , 2m − 2}. (In principle, one may also consider allocations where some goods
remain unallocated. However, since v1 and v2 are strictly monotone —that is, vj(S) <
vj(T ) for all S ( T and all j ∈ {1, 2}— all goods must be allocated in the outcome
of VCG(v1, v2).)
Now we compare the social welfare relative to (v1, v2) for such allocations:
v1(pi2m−1) + v2(∅) = (x+ (2m − 2)δ) + 0 = x+ (2m − 2)δ ,
v1(∅) + v2(pi2m−1) = 0 + (x+ (2m − 2.5)δ) = x+ (2m − 2.5)δ , and
v1(pii) + v2(pii) = (x+ (i− 1)δ) + (2m − i− 1.5)δ = x+ (2m − 2.5)δ .
Thus, in the outcome VCG(v1, v2) the allocation is (pi2m−1,∅). Hence, the social
welfare is
SW
(
(θ1, θ2),VCG(v1, v2)
)
= θ1(pi2m−1) .
On the other hand, the maximum social welfare is
MSW(θ1, θ2) ≥ θ2(pi2m−1) .
Now notice that for all θ ∈ K, we have
MSW(θ)−SW(θ,VCG(v1, v2)) ≥ θ2(pi2m−1)−θ1(pi2m−1) ≥ (x+(2m−2.5)δ)−(x+δ/2) = (2m−3)δ .
This concludes our proof of Theorem 1. 
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